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United States v. Dalton: Forcing Prosecutors to 
Draw Their Weapons from a Different Holster 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the surface, United States v. Dalton 1 appears to be just 
another double jeopardy case. Underlying the decision, howev-
er, tremendous practical ramifications affect prosecutors and 
the tack they take in trying cases involving possession and 
transfer of machine guns. If prosecutors choose to proceed un-
der 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (Section 5861),2 it is quite possible that 
they will wind up reprosecuting under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (Sec-
tion 922 (o)).3 This double prosecution unduly burdens prosecu-
1 United States v. Dalton, 990 F.2d 1166 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
2 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988). This section is part of what is known as the Na-
tional Firearms Act, which includes §§ 5801-72. Section 5861 reads: 
I d. 
It shall be unlawful for any person-
( a) to engage in business as a manufacturer or importer of, or dealer 
in, firearms without having paid the special (occupational) tax required by 
section 5801 for his business or having registered as required by section 
5802; or 
(b) to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him in violation of 
the provisions of this chapter; or 
(c) to receive or possess a firearm made in violation of the provisions 
of this chapter; or 
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in 
the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record; or 
(e) to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter; 
or 
(f) to make a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or 
(g) to obliterate, remove, change, or alter the serial number or other 
identification of a firearm required by this chapter; or 
(h) to receive or possess a firearm having the serial number or other 
identification required by this chapter obliterated, removed, changed or al-
tered; or 
(i) to receive or possess a firearm which is not identified by a serial 
number as required by this chapter; or 
(j) to transport, deliver, or receive any firearm in interstate commerce 
which has not been registered as required by this chapter; or 
(k) to receive or possess a firearm which has been imported or 
brought into the United States in violation of section 5844; or 
(!) to make, or cause the making of, a false entry on any application, 
return, or record required by this chapter, knowing such entry to be false. 
3 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988). This section was added to what is known as 
the Gun Control Act, containing §§ 921-30, in 1986 in an amending act known as 
the Firearms Owner's Protection Act, which reads: 
477 
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torial resources, which may be further taxed by the possibility 
of past Section 5861 convictions reappearing in writs of habeas 
corpus. 
This Note thoroughly examines Dalton in both its reason-
ing and practical application. The split in circuits over the 
constitutionality of Section 5861 will be discussed, followed by 
an analysis of the relative advantages of Section 5861 and 
Section 922(o) and suggestions on how prosecutors can decide 
under which statute to proceed. There will also be some discus-
sion of potential policy rationale behind the Dalton decision. 
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND-TRACING DALTON THROUGH 
THE SYSTEM 
John Dalton, an attorney, had a client who was a regis-
tered gun dealer. As payment for his services, he accepted a 
firearm which had been converted into a machine gun in 1989. 
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
convicted Dalton of violating Sections 5861(d) and (e) of the 
National Firearms Act: Subsection (d) prohibits receipt or pos-
session of an unregistered firearm; Subsection (e) prohibits the 
transfer of a firearm without compliance with the transfer 
provision in Section 5812 (which requires the transferor to see 
that the firearm is registered to the transferee and the transfer 
tax is paid). 4 
Dalton appealed his conviction, claiming he had been 
asked to perform an impossible act. In 1986, Section 922(o) was 
added to the Gun Control Act of 1968, making it illegal to pos-
sess any machine gun made after 1986. The government does 
not allow registration of machine guns falling under Section 
922(o) and does not accept the tax which would be required 
under the National Firearms Act.5 In fact, Section 5812 states 
specifically that an application for registration will be denied if 
I d. 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any per· 
son to transfer or possess a machinegun. 
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to-
(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the 
United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a de· 
partment, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or 
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was 
lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect. 
4 United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 122 (loth Cir. 1993). 
5 Id. 
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transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would violate the 
law.6 Dalton argued that requiring him to perform an act 
which was precluded by law violated both due process and 
fundamental fairness. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit agreed with Dalton and reversed the decision 
of the district court, holding that Section 5861 violated Dalton's 
due process rights. 7 
Dalton was reindicted under Section 922(o). He made a 
motion to dismiss the indictment. Dalton argued that the new 
indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment8 because his previous conviction under Section 
5861 had stemmed from the identical act. The United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado granted Dalton's 
motion to dismiss, agreeing with his double jeopardy argu-
ment.9 
The government appealed the dismissal. This time the 
court of appeals reversed the district court in favor of the gov-
ernment. The court declared that Dalton's reprosecution under 
Section 922(o) was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The case was remanded with instructions that the indictment 
be reinstated. 10 
Ill. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN Dalton 
Dalton's double jeopardy argument, which was accepted by 
the district court, was based on the standard double jeopardy 
tests outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. 
United States 11 and Grady v. Corbin. 12 The court of appeals, 
6 United States v. Kurt, 988 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1993). 
7 Dalton, 960 F.2d at 126. 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
9 United States v. Dalton, 795 F. Supp. 353, 356 (D. Colo. 1992). 
10 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1166-68. Regarding this decision, the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 1993. Dalton v. United States, 114 
S. Ct. 253 (1993). 
11 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
12 495 U.S. 508 (1990). The double jeopardy test in Blockburger is known as 
the "same elements" test. In order to pass this test, each of the two offenses in 
question must require proof of an essential element which is not required to prove 
the other offense. If this test is passed, then the "same conduct" test in Grady is 
applied. This test provides a double jeopardy bar to prosecution "if, to establish an 
essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will 
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted." Grady, 495 U.S. at 510. 
In Dalton, the district court found that the two offenses failed the Blockburger 
test, and thus an analysis under the more inclusive Grady test was not undertak-
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however, entertained very little of the district court's analysis. 
Instead, the court skirted these cases and demonstrated that 
judicially crafted exceptions to general double jeopardy 
principles applied to the facts in Dalton. The court stated: 
It has long been settled, however, that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause's general prohibition against successive prosecutions 
does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant 
who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through 
direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the 
proceedings leading to the conviction. 13 
The court then analogized Dalton to Montana v. Hall, 14 a case 
where the statute under which the defendant had been prose-
cuted did not take effect until three months after he committed 
his illegal act. In Hall, the United States Supreme Court said 
that the state had "simply relied on the wrong statute," and 
"[i]t is clear that the Constitution permits retrial after a convic-
tion is reversed because of a defect in the charging instru-
ment."15 The court of appeals found that "[Dalton] is virtually 
indistinguishable from Hall,"16 pointing out that the charging 
instrument, Section 5861, had been implicitly repealed after 
the conviction and was thus defective. Therefore, under the 
rule set forth in Hall, Dalton's reprosecution under Section 
922(o) did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 17 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Is the Double Jeopardy Analysis in Dalton Valid? 
Given the district court's analysis under the mainstream 
double jeopardy cases of Blockburger and Grady, it follows that 
the court of appeals needed substantial grounds to overturn its 
ruling. The court met this burden by relying on Supreme Court 
cases such as Hall, which carve out exceptions to the general 
double jeopardy rules. The strength of their argument is best 
en by the court. This is significant because, for those courts which may agree with 
the double jeopardy analysis of the district court, the recent overruling of Grady by 
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2852 (1993), does not affect their analysis. 
13 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1168 (quoting Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 
(1988)). 
14 481 u.s. 400 (1987). 
15 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1168 (quoting Hall, 481 U.S. at 404). 
16 ld. 
17 !d. 
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demonstrated, however, by exposing the weaknesses of the 
arguments put forth by the district court. 
Since the government's case in Dalton was based on specif-
ic exceptions to the double jeopardy rules, in order to effectively 
discount the government's claims and rely on mainstream dou-
ble jeopardy analysis the district court needed to show that the 
exceptions did not apply to the facts in Dalton. The district 
court failed to do this. The court correctly pointed out that if a 
conviction is reversed for insufficiency of evidence, 
reprosecution is not proper. The court then reasoned, however, 
that since Dalton "was convicted of a crime he could not per-
form," that "the evidence was necessarily insufficient."18 This 
is logically unsound. The evidence presented was more than 
sufficient to prove that Dalton was indeed in possession of an 
unregistered machine gun, which is unarguably a crime under 
Section 5861. The problem is with the statute itself, not the 
evidence. The court of appeals effectively refuted this argument 
by the district court. 19 
Mter presenting this faulty reasoning, the district court 
then decided that it really was not necessary because, it subse-
quently claimed, Dalton "raises double jeopardy issues indepen-
dent of those which arise after a conviction is reversed on ap-
peal."20 The court compared Brown v. Ohio,21 claiming it was 
a similar case which raised the same issues.22 This analysis, 
however, is also flawed. The comparison was based on the 
statement: "courts may not impose more than one punishment 
for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not at-
tempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial."23 
The district court relied on footnote five to this statement, 
which reads in part, "[w]e are not concerned here with the 
double jeopardy questions that may arise ... after a conviction 
is reversed on appeal."24 In Brown v. Ohio, Brown was con-
victed on one charge, actually served his sentence, and then 
18 United States v. Dalton, 795 F. Supp. 353, 356 (D. Colo. 1992). 
19 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1168. 
20 Dalton, 795 F. Supp. at 356. 
21 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred 
Brown's prosecution for auto theft after he had already been prosecuted and pun-
ished for the lesser included offense of operating the vehicle without the owner's 
consent). 
22 Dalton, 795 F. Supp at 356. 
23 Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added). 
24 ld. at 165 n.5. 
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was being reprosecuted for another crime of which his previous 
conviction was a lesser included offense. The reason the Su-
preme Court did not look at the question addressed in the foot-
note is because it was inapplicable to the facts of Brown since 
his conviction was not reversed on appeal. The double jeopardy 
question mentioned in the footnote applies to Dalton, however, 
since Dalton's first conviction under Section 5861 was reversed 
on appeal. Looking at the Court's textual statement, it is evi-
dent that it was indicating, through the use of the word "or-
dinarily" and the subsequent footnote, that there are possible 
exceptions to the general rule, particularly in the circumstances 
outlined in the footnote. The district court misinterpreted these 
exceptions. Although the appellate court never addressed this 
particular flaw in the district court's opinion, viewed correctly 
it actually strengthens the court of appeals' position on rever-
sal. 
Finally, the district court claimed that Hall recognizes 
"that where Blockburger double jeopardy issues are implicated 
the rule allowing reprosecutions after a reversal on grounds 
other than insufficiency of the evidence is inapplicable."25 This 
language in Hall26 appears in a footnote to the statement: 
"[b]ut the Brown analysis is not apposite in this [Hall] case,"27 
and the footnote reads "[ w ]e explicitly noted in Brown that the 
case did not raise 'the double jeopardy questions that may arise 
... after a conviction is reversed on appeal."'28 
In context, the district court's final argument in Dalton 
was merely an extension of its previous misinterpretation of 
Brown, lending further consistency to the appellate court's 
analysis in Dalton. So although the Court of Appeals did not 
extensively dismantle the district court's opinion, it is clear 
that the interplay of double jeopardy rules and Supreme Court-
created exceptions supported the reversal of the district court. 
B. Is Section 5861 Really Unconstitutional? 
1. The Tenth Circuit says yes 
In Dalton's original appeal of his conviction under Section 
5861, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to United 
25 Dalton, 795 F. Supp. at 356. 
26 Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 404 n.2 (1987). 
27 ld. at 404. 
28 !d. at 404 n.2 (quoting Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 n.5). 
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States u. Rock Island Armory,29 Sonzinsky u. United States,30 
and the legislative history of the National Firearms Act in 
order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of this section. 
Central to the court's reasoning was the taxing purpose behind 
the statute. When Congress passed the National Firearms Act, 
it chose to go about regulating the making, sale, possession, 
and transfer of machine guns through the taxing power grant-
ed it by the Constitution. The primary reason for this was to 
avoid improper use of congressional power to regulate what 
could be considered a local activity and thus within the power 
of the states to regulate. 
In Sonzinsky, the regulatory purpose of the National Fire-
arms Act was challenged on these basic grounds, claiming that 
the tax was unconstitutional since it was, in reality, a penalty 
imposed to aid regulation of machine gun trafficking. The Su-
preme Court rejected this challenge, claiming that the registra-
tion provisions were supportable as a means of generating 
revenue and stating that, "[o]n its face, it is only a taxing mea-
sure."31 
In Rock Island Armory: 
[T]he court pointed out that this Act was passed and has been 
consistently upheld under the power of Congress to raise 
revenue. The court reasoned that because the possession of 
machineguns made after 1986 is illegal under section 922(o) 
and the government will therefore no longer register and tax 
them, and because the registration requirements are solely in 
aid of collecting the tax, the constitutional base for those re-
quirements-i.e., the power to tax-has disappeared. Accord-
ingly, the court held the registration requirements constitu-
tionally invalid as to firearms that the government no longer 
taxes. 32 
The Tenth Circuit adopted this position in Dalton's first appeal, 
declaring that Section 922(o), as added to the Gun Control Act, 
does indeed render Section 5861 of the National Firearms Act 
constitutionally invalid for the reasons stated in Rock Island 
Armory. "To put the proposition as plainly as we are able: a 
provision which is passed as an exercise of the taxing power no 
29 773 F. Supp. 117 (C.D. Ill. 1991). 
30 300 U.S. 506 (1937). 
31 United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 124-25 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513). 
32 ld. 
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longer has that constitutional basis when Congress decrees 
that the subject of that provision can no longer be taxed."33 
2. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits say no 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Dalton reasoning in United 
States v. Jones. 34 Jones was convicted of possessing, transfer-
ring, and transporting in interstate commerce two shotguns 
which he had modified into automatic weapons and sold to 
undercover government agents. He was convicted under the 
National Firearms Act. Part of his appeal relied on Dalton and 
the assertion that the government should have tried him under 
the Gun Control Act instead. In rejecting Jones' argument, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned: "In the absence of 
some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only 
permissible justification for repeal by implication is when the 
earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable."35 The court 
pointed out that no affirmative showing of an intent to repeal 
the National Firearms Act appears in either the statutory text 
or the legislative history of the 1986 amendment to the Gun 
Control Act. Absent such showing, the two statutes must be 
examined for irreconcilability. The court reasoned that the two 
statutes are not irreconcilable because "neither act requires 
him to deal in such guns. Simply put, Jones can comply with 
both acts by refusing to deal in newly-made machine guns."36 
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the reasoning in Dalton 
concerning the inapplicability of the taxing provision. It pointed 
out that the government still taxes the making of illegal ma-
chine guns even though possession and transfer are not 
taxed.37 While the Dalton court claimed that taxing the mak-
ing of machine guns is irrelevant to prosecution of possessing 
and transferring, the court maintained that knowing the chain 
of possession and transfer helps to determine the maker of the 
firearm and is thus "supportable as in aid of a revenue pur-
pose."38 In addition, the court pointed to Minor v. United 
States39 to support its claim that, even if the power to tax 
33 !d. at 125. 
34 976 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1992). 
35 !d. at 183 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)). 
36 Jones, 976 F.2d at 183. 
37 !d.; see also Dalton, 960 F.2d at 125. 
38 Jones, 976 F.2d at 184 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 
513 (1937)). 
39 396 U.S. 87, 98 (1969). 
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were no longer sufficient to support the statute, Congress' pow-
er under the Commerce Clause would certainly be sufficient to 
support it in Jones' case.40 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States u. Ross,41 rejected 
Dalton and adopted the analysis set forth in Jones. Since Rock 
Island Arnwry was decided by the Central District Court of 
Illinois, which is contained within the Seventh Circuit, its hold-
ing appears to be overruled by Ross. While the Seventh Circuit 
never expressed this intention, it did mention that Jones re-
jects both Rock Island Armory and Dalton. 
3. The Ninth Circuit is unclear 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States u. Kurt,42 noted with 
favor the reasoning in Dalton.43 In Kurt, the Ninth Circuit 
quoted heavily from Dalton but then stated that it "need not 
resolve the question of whether Kurt could have been convicted 
under [Section] 5861 if he was in possession of a gun which 
had been purchased or converted after May 19, 1986, since he 
has failed to show that [Section] 5861 is unconstitutional in its 
application to him."44 The court then said that since Kurt had 
not presented evidence demonstrating when the gun was either 
purchased or converted, he had not carried the burden neces-
sary to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute.45 
While the Ninth Circuit did not expressly find Section 5861 
unconstitutional, the court's extensive reliance on the analysis 
in Dalton seems to indicate that, given the right case, it would 
follow Dalton. 
This apparent leaning by the court of appeals did not sway 
the district court for the Central District of California in United 
States u. O'Mara.46 In this case O'Mara was convicted under 
Section 5861(d) of possession of an unregistered machine gun. 
Subsequently, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in which he 
moved to have his sentence vacated. The district court in 
O'Mara seized upon the fact that Kurt did not expressly decide 
the constitutionality of Section 5861 convictions because Kurt 
40 Jones, 976 F.2d at 183-84. 
41 9 F.3d 1182, 1192-94 (7th Cir. 1993). 
42 988 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1993). 
43 United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121 (lOth Cir. 1993). 
44 Kurt, 988 F.2d at 75-76. 
45 Id. at 76. 
46 827 F. Supp. 1468 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
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was not clearly subject to Section 922(o). It pointed out that 
O'Mara was subject to Section 922(o) and then proceeded to 
demonstrate the flaws in the Dalton analysis.47 
The district court argued persuasively that, due to the 
1968 amendment of the National Firearms Act, the transferee 
is exempt from the statute's registration requirement. Because 
of this, the court stated: "the NF A creates a single mandate for 
the transferee of the firearm. It prohibits him from accepting 
possession of a firearm that has not been properly registered by 
the transferor."48 This reading supports the Jones analysis by 
demonstrating that both statutes can be complied with if the 
transferee merely refuses to take possession of the unregistered 
machine gun. 49 
The district court also attacked the assumption in Dalton 
that the sole constitutional basis of Section 5861 was the tax-
ing power, pointing out that in United States v. Evans,50 "[t]he 
Ninth Circuit holds that section 5861(d) is a valid exercise of 
the authority vested in Congress by the commerce clause."51 
This reasoning demonstrated that, even if the taxing provision 
is of no purpose after the enactment of Section 922(o), there is 
still a valid constitutional underpinning for Section 5861. 
The juxtaposition of the dicta in the Kurt case against the 
well-reasoned O'Mara district court opinion makes it unclear 
which path the Ninth Circuit will choose to follow on this issue. 
Thus the circuits are split concerning the constitutionality of 
the National Firearms Act, with the Fourth and Seventh Cir-
cuit going one direction, the Tenth Circuit the other direction, 
and the Ninth Circuit in a state of flux. While a thorough anal-
ysis of the viability of these divergent opinions is beyond the 
scope of this Note, it should be evident that the unstable state 
of the NFA provides federal prosecutors quite a tightrope to 
walk, especially in the jurisdictions which have yet to address 
the issue. 
47 !d. at 1470-72. 
48 !d. at 1471. 
49 Nevertheless, the district court in O'Mara notes that this analysis would 
not apply to a transferor of firearms, since they are required to register the fire-
arms under the amended NFA. !d. at 1471 n.l2. They point out that the defen-
dant in Jones was a maker of firearms, and thus the Jones analysis was errone-
ously applied in that case. 
50 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991). 
51 O'Mara, 827 F. Supp. at 1472. 
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C. How Can Prosecutors Decide Which Statute to Use? 
In helping prosecutors decide under which statute to in-
dict, the question which must logically be asked now is: What 
are the advantages to indictment under Section 5861 as op-
posed to Section 922(o)? In addressing this question, we will 
put aside the issue of taxation, assuming that the primary 
purpose of both statutes is to regulate the trafficking of fire-
arms. To begin with, sentencing does not appear to be an issue. 
There is no distinction within the Sentencing Guidelines which 
would result in differing sentences according to the statute 
under which the charge came. 52 
Looking at the statutory language, Section 5861 is applica-
ble to "firearms,"53 whereas Section 922(o) is applicable only 
to "machineguns."54 The definition of a machine gun is the 
same in Section 922 as it is in Section 5845 of the National 
Firearms Act,55 but the definition of firearm under Section 
5845 is much broader.56 This obviously makes Section 5861 
52 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2K2.1 (1993). 
53 See 26 U.S.C. § 5861, supra note 2. 
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), supra note 3. 
55 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4). The definition in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) reads: 
The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to 
shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one 
shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The 
term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any 
part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts 
designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a 
machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can 
be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a 
person. 
56 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) reads: 
The term "firearm" means (1) a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less 
than 18 inches in length; (2) a weapon made from a shotgun if such 
weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a 
barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; (3) a rifle having a 
barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (4) a weapon made 
from a rifle if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 
26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (5) any 
other weapon, as defined in subsection (e); (6) a machinegun; (7) any 
silencer (as defmed in section 921 of title 18, United States Code); and 
(8) a destructive device. The term "firearm" shall not include an antique 
firearm or any device (other than a machinegun or destructive device) 
which, although redesigned as a weapon, the Secretary finds by reason of 
the date of its manufacture, value, design, and other characteristics is 
primarily a collector's item and is not likely to be used as a weapon. 
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broader in its reach, but the types of firearms listed other than 
machine guns can still be validly controlled under Section 
586-even if it is considered unconstitutional with respect to 
machine guns-because it was Section 922(o) which rendered 
Section 5861 unconstitutional. In other words, since Section 
922(o) is only applicable to possession and transfer of machine 
guns, it can only invalidate Section 5861 with respect to posses-
sion and transfer of machine guns. 
It is not apparent anywhere that Section 922(o) is in any 
way inferior to Section 5861 with regard to the regulatory ef-
fect it has on possession and transfer of machine guns. Thus, 
prosecutors have the same statutory weapons they had origi-
nally under Section 5861, but some of them are now drawn 
from a different statutory holster. Mter determining there is no 
advantage to indictment under either statute, how does a pros-
ecutor decide under which statute to indict? The answer is 
obviously dependent on the jurisdiction. Prosecutors in the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to be safe to use either 
statute in a possession and transfer case considering the hold-
ings in Jones and Ross. Prosecutors in the Tenth Circuit should 
certainly use Section 922(o) for such cases, and, given the un-
certainty in the Ninth Circuit, Section 922(o) seems the safer 
route for prosecutors there as well. 
As far as the open jurisdictions are concerned, it is a judg-
ment call. Prosecutors would obviously prefer that the rationale 
of the Jones court be adopted, thus giving them license to indict 
under either statute according to any preference they may 
have. Given the right fact situation, if a prosecutor saw indica-
tors that their circuit preferred the Jones analysis, they might 
want to test the court. The risks probably outnumber the po-
tential benefits, however. If the court in a particular jurisdic-
tion adopts the Dalton analysis, the prosecutor must go back 
and reindict under Section 922(o), taking the case through the 
system again. There are no guarantees that the court will allow 
this. The court may instead adopt the double jeopardy analysis 
of the District of Colorado District Court (although it was over-
ruled), barring reprosecution completely. The Ninth Circuit, 
albeit prior to the second Dalton ruling by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, indicated in dicta at the end of Kurt that 
such reindictment would be barred by the Double Jeopardy 
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Clause. 57 Even if the court allows reindictment and 
reprosecution, the attempt under Section 5861 has resulted in 
a waste of time and resources which could have been avoided 
had the original indictment been under Section 922(o). Since 
there are no evident benefits of Section 5861 over Section 
922(o), it is apparent that initial indictment under Section 
922(o) is both the safe and efficient choice for virtually all cir-
cuits. 
D. Potential Policy Reasons for the Dalton Decision 
While the Dalton analysis is grounded on sound double 
jeopardy principles, some practical effects of the decision may 
have played a part in the court's decision. 
1. Judicial economy 
Had the Dalton court decided differently, the decision could 
have opened for prosecutors a whole new Pandora's box. With 
post-1986 convictions under Section 5861 for possession and 
transfer considered constitutionally infirm in the Tenth Circuit, 
writs of habeas corpus could become an option for inmates 
serving time under such convictions. With no way to reindict 
these individuals, it could become an increasingly exercised op-
tion, causing a caseload increase for already overburdened 
prosecutors. However, with the likelihood that a successful writ 
of habeas corpus will be followed by a valid reindictment under 
Section 922(o), this option will probably not be nearly as attrac-
tive to inmates. 
2. Public policy requires punishment of the guilty 
A second very practical consideration is that of punishment 
for the guilty. Many people, especially outside of the legal com-
munity, express continual frustration at seeing convicted crimi-
nals turned loose on technicalities. The Dalton decision insures 
that prosecutors still have a weapon to use against guilty par-
ties whose convictions are invalid due to the unconstitutionality 
of the statute under which they were convicted. Thus, the pub-
lic policy requiring that those individuals guilty of a crime be 
punished is furthered in the Tenth Circuit by Dalton. 
57 United States v. Kurt, 988 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The double jeopardy analysis in Dalton has significant 
ramifications for prosecutors. It affords them the ability to 
reprosecute individuals under a valid statute if the statute 
under which the prior conviction was obtained is found to be 
unconstitutional. This decision also raises practical issues for 
prosecutors which must be considered, the greatest of which is 
whether to pursue prosecution of an individual accused of pos-
session and transfer of a machine gun under Section 5861 or 
Section 922(o). Since both statutes serve the same regulatory 
function, without any perceived advantages to either, Section 
922(o) affords prosecutors the path of least resistance and 
greatest efficiency, and should be used accordingly. 
Benton Larsen 
